In this paper we prove lower and matching upper bounds for the number of servers required to implement a regular shared register that tolerates unsynchronized Mobile Byzantine failures. We consider the strongest model of Mobile Byzantine failures to date: agents are moved arbitrarily by an omniscient adversary from a server to another in order to deviate their computation in an unforeseen manner. When a server is infected by an Byzantine agent, it behaves arbitrarily until the adversary decides to "move" the agent to another server. Previous approaches considered asynchronous servers with synchronous mobile Byzantine agents (yielding impossibility results), and synchronous servers with synchronous mobile Byzantine agents (yielding optimal solutions for regular register implementation, even in the case where servers and agents periods are decoupled).
I. INTRODUCTION
Byzantine fault tolerance is a fundamental building block in distributed system, as Byzantine failures include all possible faults, attacks, virus infections and arbitrary behaviors that can occur in practice (even unforeseen ones). The classical setting considers Byzantine participants remain during the entire execution, yet software rejuvenation techniques increase the possibility that a corrupted node does not remain corrupted during the whole system execution and may be aware of its previously compromised status [20] .
Mobile Byzantine Failures (MBF) models have been recently introduced to integrate those concerns. Then, faults are represented by Byzantine agents that are managed by an omniscient adversary that "moves" them from a host process to another, an agent being able to corrupt its host in an unforeseen manner. MBF investigated so far consider mostly round-based computations, and can be classified according to Byzantine mobility constraints: (i) constrained mobility [10] agents may only move from one host to another when protocol messages are sent (similarly to how viruses would propagate), while (ii) unconstrained mobility [2] , [4] , [11] , [16] , [17] , [18] agents may move independently of protocol messages. In the case of unconstrained mobility, several variants were investigated [2] , [4] , [11] , [16] , [17] , [18] : Reischuk [17] considers that malicious agents are stationary for a given period of time, Ostrovsky and Yung [16] introduce the notion of mobile viruses and define the adversary as an entity that can inject and distribute faults; finally, Garay [11] , and more recently Banu et al. [2] , and Sasaki et al. [18] and Bonnet et al. [4] consider that processes execute synchronous rounds composed of three phases: send, receive, and compute. Between two consecutive such synchronous rounds, Byzantine agents can move from one node to another. Hence the set of faulty hosts at any given time has a bounded size, yet its membership may evolve from one round to the next. The main difference between the aforementioned four works [2] , [4] , [11] , [18] lies in the knowledge that hosts have about their previous infection by a Byzantine agent. In Garay's model [11] , a host is able to detect its own infection after the Byzantine agent left it. Sasaki et al. [18] investigate a model where hosts cannot detect when Byzantine agents leave. Finally, Bonnet et al. [4] considers an intermediate setting where cured hosts remain in control on the messages they send (in particular, they send the same message to all destinations, and they do not send obviously fake information, e.g. fake id). Those subtle differences on the power of Byzantine agents turns out to have an important impact on the bounds for solving distributed problems.
A first step toward decoupling algorithm rounds from mobile Byzantine moves is due to Bonomi et al. [8] . In their model, mobile Byzantine movements are either: (i) synchronized, but the period of movement is independent to that of algorithm rounds, (ii) independent time bounded, meaning that Byzantine agents are only requested to remain some minimum amount of time at any occupied node, or (iii) independent time unbounded, which can be seen as a special case of (ii) when the minimum amount of time is one time unit. In particular, the Bonomi et al. [8] model implies that Byzantine moves are no more related to messages that are exchanged through the protocol. a) Register Emulation: Traditional solutions to build a Byzantine tolerant storage service (a.k.a. register emulation) can be divided into two categories: replicated state machines [19] , and Byzantine quorum systems [3] , [13] , [15] , [14] . Both approaches are based on the idea that the current state of the storage is replicated among processes, and the main difference lies in the number of replicas that are simultaneously involved in the state maintenance protocol. Several works investigated the emulation of self-stabilizing or pseudo-stabilizing Byzantine tolerant SWMR or MWMR registers [1] , [7] , [6] . All these works do not consider the complex case of mobile Byzantine faults. Recently, Bonomi et al. [5] proposed optimal selfstabilizing atomic register implementations for round-based synchronous systems under the four Mobile Byzantine models described in [2] , [4] , [11] , [18] . The round-free model [8] where Byzantine moves are decoupled from protocol rounds also enables optimal solutions (with respect to the number of Byzantine agents) for the implementation of regular registers. However, this last solution requires Byzantine agents to move in synchronous steps, whose duration for the entire execution is fixed, so the movements of Byzantine agents is essentially synchronous. As it is impossible to solve the register emulation problem when processes are asynchronous and Byzantine agents are synchronous [8] , the only case remaining open is that of synchronous processes and unsynchronized Byzantine agents.
b) Our Contribution: We relax the main assumption made for obtaining positive results in the round-free model: Byzantine moves are no more synchronized. The main contribution of this paper is to thoroughly study the impact of unsynchronized mobile Byzantine agents on the register emulation problem. We present lower and matching upper bounds for implementing a regular register in the unsynchronized mobile Byzantine model. We first explore and characterize the key parameters of the model that enable problem solvability. As expected, lower bounds results require completely new proof techniques that are of independent interest while studying other classical problems in the context of unsynchronized mobile Byzantine agents. When the problem is solvable, it turns out that minor changes to existing quorum-based protocols joint with smart choices of quorum thresholds command optimal resilience (with respect to the number of Byzantine agents). Table I summarizes all the lower bounds for the various models, the newly obtained results are presented in boldface.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a distributed system composed of an arbitrary large set of client processes C, and a set of n server processes S = {s 1 , s 2 . . . s n }. Each process in the distributed system (i.e., both servers and clients) is identified by a unique identifier. Servers run a distributed protocol emulating a shared memory abstraction, and clients are unaware of the protocol run by the servers. The passage of time is measured by a fictional global clock (e.g., that spans the set of natural integers), whose processes are unaware of.At each time instant t, each process (either client or server) is characterized by its internal state, i.e., by the set of its local variables and their assigned values. We assume that an arbitrary number of clients may crash, and that up to f servers host, at any time t, a Byzantine agent. Furthermore, server processes execute the same algorithm, and cannot rely on high level primitives such as consensus or total order broadcast. Communication model. Processes communicate through message passing. In particular, we assume that: (i) each client c i ∈ C can communicate with every server through a broadcast() primitive, (ii) each server can communicate with every other server through a broadcast() primitive, and (iii) each server can communicate with a particular client through a send() unicast primitive. We assume that communications are authenticated (i.e., given a message m, the identity of its sender cannot be forged) and reliable (i.e., spurious messages are not created and sent messages are neither lost nor duplicated). Timing Assumptions. The system is round-free synchronous in the sense that: (i) the processing time of local computations (except for wait statements) are negligible with respect to communication delays, and are assumed to be equal to 0, and (ii) messages take time to travel to their destination processes. In particular, concerning point-to-point communications, we assume that if a process sends a message m at time t then it is delivered by time t + δ p (with δ p > 0). Similarly, let t be the time at which a process p invokes the broadcast(m) primitive, then there is a constant δ b (with δ b ≥ δ p ) such that all servers have delivered m at time t + δ b . For the sake of presentation, in the following we consider a unique message delivery delay δ (equal to δ b ≥ δ p ), and assume δ is known to every process. Computation model. Each process of the distributed system executes a distributed protocol P that is composed by a set of distributed algorithms. Each algorithm in P is represented by a finite state automaton and it is composed of a sequence of computation and communication steps. A computation step is represented by the computation executed locally to each process while a communication step is represented by the sending and the delivering events of a message. Computation steps and communication steps are generally called events. Definition 1 (Execution History): Let P be a distributed protocol. Let H be the set of all the events generated by P at any process p i in the distributed system and let → be the happened-before relation. An execution history (or simply history)Ĥ = (H, →) is a partial order on H satisfying the relation →.
Definition 2 (Valid State at time t): LetĤ = (H, →) be an execution history of a generic computation and let P be the corresponding protocol. Let p i be a process and let state pi be the state of p i at some time t. state pi is said to be valid at time t if it can be generated by executing P onĤ. MBF model. We now recall the generalized Mobile Byzantine Failure model [8] . Informally, in the MBF model, when a Byzantine agent is hosted by a process, the agent takes entire control of its host making it Byzantine faulty (i.e., it can corrupt the host's local variables, forces it to send arbitrary messages, etc.). Then, the Byzantine agent leaves its host with a possible corrupted state (that host is called cured) before reaching another host. We assume that any process previously hosting a Byzantine agent has access to a tamper-proof memory storing the correct protocol code. However, a cured server may still have a corrupted internal state, and thus cannot be considered correct. The moves of a Byzantine agent are controlled by an omniscient adversary. Definition 3 (Correct process at time t): LetĤ = (H, →) be a history, and let P be the protocol generatingĤ. A process is correct at time t if (i) it is correctly executing P, and (ii) its state is valid at time t. We denote by Co(t) the set of correct processes at time t. Given a time interval [t, t ], we denote by Co([t, t ]) the set of all processes that remain correct during
Definition 4 (Byzantine process at time t): LetĤ = (H, →) be a history, and let P be the protocol generatingĤ. A process is Byzantine at time t if it is controlled by a Byzantine agent and does not execute P. We denote by B(t) the set of Byzantine processes at time t. Given a time interval [t, t ], we denote by B([t, t ]) the set of all processes that remain Byzantine during
Definition 5 (Cured process at time t): LetĤ = (H, →) be a history, and let P be the protocol generatingĤ. A process is cured at time t if (i) it is correctly executing P, and (ii) its state is not valid at time t. We denote by Cu(t) the set of cured processes at time t. Given a time interval [t, t ], we denote by Cu([t, t ]) the set of all processes that remain cured
With respect to the movements of agents, we consider the independent time-bounded (ITB) model: each mobile Byzantine agent ma i is forced to remain on a host for at least a period Δ i . Given two mobile Byzantine Agents ma i and ma j , their movement periods Δ i and Δ j may be different. Note that previous results considering decoupled Byzantine moves [8] were established in the weaker Δ-synchronized (ΔS) model, where the external adversary moves all controlled mobile Byzantine agents at the same time t, and their movements happen periodically with period Δ. None of those properties remain valid in our model.
Concerning the knowledge that each process has about its failure state, we distinguish the following two cases: Cured Aware Model (CAM): at any time t, every process is aware about its failure state; Cured Unaware Model (CUM): at any time t, every process is not aware about its failure state.
We assume that the adversary can control at most f Byzantine agents at any time (i.e., Byzantine agents do not replicate while moving). In our work, only servers can be affected by the mobile Byzantine agents 1 . It follows that, at any time t, |B(t)| ≤ f . However, during the system lifetime, all servers may be hosting a Byzantine agent at some point (i.e., none of the servers is guaranteed to remain correct forever). Register Specification. A register is a shared variable accessed by a set of processes, called clients, through two operations, namely read and write. Informally, the write operation updates the value stored in the shared variable, while the read obtains the value contained in the variable (i.e., the last written value). Every operation issued on a register is, generally, not instantaneous and it can be characterized by two events occurring at its boundaries: an invocation event and a reply event. These events occur at two time instants (called the invocation time and the reply time) according to the fictional global time.
An operation op is complete if both the invocation event and the reply event occurred, otherwise, it failed.Given two operations op and op , their invocation times (t B (op) and t B (op )) and reply times (t E (op) and t E (op )), op precedes op (op ≺ op ) if and only if t E (op) < t B (op ). If op does not precede op and op does not precede op, then op and op are concurrent (noted op||op ). Given a write(v) operation, the value v is said to be written when the operation is complete.
In this paper, we consider a single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) regular register, as defined by Lamport [12] , which is specified as follows: -Termination: if a correct client invokes an operation op, op completes.
-Validity: A read returns the last written value before its invocation (i.e. the value written by the latest completed write preceding it), or a value written by a write concurrent with it.
III. LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we provide lower bounds for (IT B, CAM ) and (IT B, CU M ) models. In particular we first prove lower bounds for the (ΔS, CAM ) and (ΔS, CU M ) models and then we extend those results to (IT B, CAM ) and (IT B, CU M ) models. The detailed proofs accompanied by corresponding explanations can be found in technical report [9] . We consider a read operation whose duration T r is such that T r ≥ 2δ (according to previous work [8] , each read operation requires at least a request-reply exchange). Our lower bound proof constructs two indistinguishable executions. The tricky part is to characterize the set of messages sent by correct and incorrect servers when the read operation has a variable duration. In the following, we first characterize such sets with respect to Δ, T r and γ where γ is the required time to finalize the maintenance operation. Then, we show how to build two indistinguishable executions. For clarity, we note that a correct message/request/reply is a message that carries a valid value when it is sent. Otherwise, the message is incorrect.
It has been proven [8] that a protocol P reg implementing a regular register in a mobile Byzantine setting must include in addition to the mandatory read and write operations an additional operation, maintenance, defined below.
Definition 6 (Maintenance operation maintenance): A maintenance operation is an operation that, when executed by a process p i , terminates at some time t leaving p i with a valid state at time t (i.e., it guarantees that p i is correct at time t).
The following definition defines γ, the duration of a maintenance operation.
Definition 7 (Curing time, γ): We define γ as the maximum time a server can be in a cured state. More formally, let T c be the time at which server s c is left by a mobile agent, let op M the first maintenance operation that correctly terminates, then
In order to build our indistinguishable executions, we define below a scenario to characterize agents movements. Then with respect to this scenario, we construct two indistinguishable executions.
Definition 8 (Scenario S * ): Let S * be the following scenario: for each time T i , i ≥ 0 the affected servers are
Let us characterize the P reg protocol in the most general possible way. By definition a register abstraction involves read() and write() operations issued by clients. A read operation involves at least a request − reply communication pattern (i.e., two communication steps). Thus, given the system synchrony, a read() operation op R lasts at least T r ≥ 2δ time. Moreover we consider that a correct server sends a reply message in two occasions: (i) after the delivery of a request message, and (ii) right after it changes its state, at the end of the maintenance operation if an op R is occurring. The latter case exploits the maintenance operation allowing servers to reply with a valid value in case they were Byzantine at the beginning of the read operation. Moreover we assume that in ( * , CAM) model servers in a cured state do not participate in the read operation. Notice that those servers are aware of their current cured state and are aware of their impossibility to send correct replies. Even though those may seems not very general assumptions, let us just consider that we are allowing servers to correctly contribute to the computation as soon as they can and stay silent when they can not and under those assumptions we prove lower bounds. Thus if we remove those assumptions the lower bounds do not decrease. Scenario and protocol has been characterized. Now we aim to characterize the set of servers, regarding their failure states, that can appear during the execution of the protocol, in particular during the read() operation. Those sets allow us to characterize correct and incorrect messages that a client delivers during a read() operation.
Definition 9 (Failure State of servers in a time interval): Let [t, t + T r ] be a time interval and let t , t > 0, be a time instant. Let s i be a server and state i be
is the set of servers that have been in the state state i for at least one time unit during [t, t+T r ]. More formally,
In particular let us denote:
Definition 12 (MaxB(t, t + T r )): Let S be a scenario and [t, t + T r ] a time interval. The cardinality ofB S (t, t + T r ) is maximum with respect to S if for any t , t > 0, we have that |B S (t, t + T r )| ≥ |B S (t , t + T r )|. Then we call the value of such cardinality as MaxB S (t, t + T r ).
Definition 13 (M axSil(t, t + T r )): Let S be a scenario and [t, t + T r ] a time interval. The cardinality of Sil S (t, t + T r ) is maximum with respect to S if for any t , t ≥ 0 we have that |Sil(t, t + T r )| ≥ |Sil(t , t + T r )| andB(t, t + T r ) = MaxB(t, t + T r ). Then we call the value of such cardinality as M axSil S (t, t + T r ).
Definition 14 (MaxCu(t)): Let S be a scenario and t be a time instant. The cardinality of Cu S (t) is maximum with respect to S if for any t , t ≥ 0, we have that |Cu S (t )| ≤ |Cu S (t)| andB(t, t + T r ) = MaxB(t, t + T r ). We call the value of such cardinality as MaxCu S (t).
Definition 15 (minCo(t, t + T r )): Let S be a scenario and [t, t + T r ] be a time interval then minCo S (t, t + T r ) denotes the minimum number of correct servers during a time interval
Definition 16 (minCBC(t, t + T r )): Let [t, t + T r ] be a time interval then minCBC(t, t + T r ) denotes the minimum number of servers that during a time interval [t, t + T r ] belong first toB(t, t+T r ) or Cu(t) (only in (ΔS, CU M ) model) and then to Co(t + δ, t + T r − δ) or vice versa andB(t, t + T r ) = MaxB(t, t + T r ).
In particular let us denote as:
• minBC(t, t + T r ) the minimum number of servers that during a time interval [t, t + T r ] belong toB(t, t + T r ) or Cu(t) (only in (ΔS, CU M ) model) and toCo(t + δ, t + T r − δ). • minCB(t, t + T r ) the minimum number of servers that during a time interval [t, t + T r ] belong toCo(t + δ, t + T r − δ) and toB(t, t + T r ). Since we consider only scenario S * , then we can omit the subscript related to S * and write directly MaxB(t, t + T ), minSil(t, t + T ), MaxCu(t), minCo(t, t + T ) and minCBC(t, t + T ).
Lemma 1: MaxB(t, t + T r ) = ( Tr Δ + 1)f . At this point we can compute how many correct and incorrect replies a client c k can deliver in the worst case scenario during a time interval [t, t + T r ]. Trivially, c k in order to distinguish correct and incorrect replies needs to get more replies from correct servers than from Byzantine servers. It follows that the number of correct servers has to be always enough to guarantee this condition. Table II follows directly from this observation. In a model with b Byzantine (non mobile) a client c i requires to get at least 2b + 1 replies to break the symmetry and thus n ≥ 2b + 1. In presence of mobile Byzantine we have to sum also servers that do not reply (silent) and do not count twice servers that reply with both incorrect and correct values.
Considering the definitions of both MaxB(t, t + T r ) and MaxCu(t) the next Corollary follows:
Corollary 1: In the worst case scenario, during a read operation lasting T r ≥ 2δ issued by client c i , c i delivers MaxB(t, t + T r ) incorrect replies in the (ΔS, CAM ) model and MaxB(t, t + T r ) + MaxCu(t) incorrect replies in the (ΔS, CU M ) model . Definition 18 (minReplies Co(t, t + T r ) k ): Let minReplies Co(t, t + T r ) k be the multi-set maintained by client c k containing m ij elements, where m ij is the i − th message delivered by c k and sent at time t , t ∈ [t, t + T r ] by s j such that s j ∈ Co(t ).
Theorem 1: If n < n CAMLB (n < n CUMLB ) as defined in Table IV , then there not exists a protocol P reg solving the safe register specification in (ΔS, CAM ) model ((ΔS, CU M ) model respectively). Proof Let us suppose that n < n CAMLB (n < n CUMLB ) and that protocol P reg does exist. If a client c i invokes a read operation op, lasting T r ≥ 2δ time, if no write operations occur, then c i returns a valid value at time t B (op) . Let us consider an execution E 0 where c i invokes a read operation op and let 0 be the valid value at t B (op). Let us assume that all Byzantine severs involved in such operation reply once with 1. From Corollaries 1 and 2 (cf. [9] ), c i collects M axReplies NCo(t, t + T r ) i occurrences of 1 and minReplies Co(t, t+T r ) i occurrences of 0. Since P reg exists and no write operations occur, then c i returns 0. Let us now consider a another execution E 1 where c i invokes a read operation op and let 1 be the valid value at t B (op). Let us assume that all Byzantine severs involved in such operation replies once with 0. From Corollaries 1 and 2 and Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 (cf. [9] ), c i collects M axReplies NCo(t, t+T r ) i occurrences of 0 and minReplies Co(t, t + T r ) i occurrences of 1. Since P reg exists and no write operations occur, then c i returns 1.
From Lemma 1 and using values in Table IV we obtain following equations for both models:
It follows that in E 0 and E 1 c i delivers the same occurrences of 0 and 1, both executions are indistinguishable leading to a contradiction.
M axReplies NCo(t, t + T r ) i and minReplies Co(t, t + T r ) i are equal independently from the value assumed by T r , the read() operation duration. From the equation just used in the previous lemma the next Corollary follows.
Corollary 5:
At this point we compute minCu(t), M axSil(t, t + T r ) and minCBC(t, t + T r ) to finally state exact lower bounds depending on the system parameters, in particular depending on Δ, γ and the servers awareness. An interested reader can find proofs in the technical report [9] . In Table III are reported all the results for (ΔS, * ) models.
Lemma 10: Let n * LB ≤ α * (Δ, δ, γ)f be the impossibility results holding in the (ΔS, * ) model for f = 1. If there exists a tight protocol P reg solving the safe register for n ≥ α * (Δ, δ, γ)f + 1 (f ≥ 1) then all the Safe Register 
a if maxCu(t) > 0 otherwise is the same value of minCBC(t, t + Tr) in the ( * , CAM) model impossibility results that hold in the (ΔS, * ) models hold also in the (IT B, * ) and (IT U, * ) models.
Proof Let us consider the scenario S * for f = 1 and a read() operation time interval [t, t + T r ], t ≥ 0. Depending on the value of t there can be different (but finite) read scenarios, rs 1 , rs 2 , . . . , rs s . By hypothesis there exists P reg solving the safe register for n ≥ α * f (Δ, δ, γ) + 1 then among the read scenarios RS = {rs 1 , rs 2 , . . . , rs s } all the possible worst case scenarios {wrs 1 , . . . , wrs w } ⊆ RS hold for n = α * (Δ, δ, γ)f (meaning that P reg does not exist). We can say that those worst scenarios are equivalent in terms of replicas, i.e., for each wsr k is it possible to build an impossibility run if n = α * (Δ, δ, γ) but P reg works if n = α * (Δ, δ, γ) + 1 (if we consider f = 1). Let us now consider (ΔS, * ) for f > 1. In this case, mobile agents move all together, thus the same wrs k scenario is reproduced f times. For each wrs k scenario is it possible to build an impossibility run if n = α * (Δ, δ, γ)f , i.e., α * (Δ, δ, γ) − 1 non Byzantine servers are not enough to cope with 1 Byzantine server, then it is straightforward that α * (Δ, δ, γ) − f non Byzantine servers are not enough to cope with f Byzantine servers, the same scenario is reproduced f times.
In the case of unsynchronized movements (ITB and ITU) we consider Δ = min {Δ 1 , . . . , Δ f }. Each mobile agent generates a different read scenarios, those scenario can be up to f . As we just stated, if P reg exists, those worst case scenarios are equivalent each others in terms of replicas. Since all the worst case scenarios are equivalent in terms of replicas, thus impossibility results holding for mobile agents moving together hold also for mobile agent moving in an uncoordinated way.
In [8] , for n ≥ α * (Δ, δ, γ)f + 1 (f ≥ 1), it has been presented a tight protocol P reg that solves the Regular Register problem whose bounds match the safe register lower bounds. Thus the next corollary follows. 
IV. UPPER BOUNDS
In this section, we present an overview of the optimal protocols that implement a SWMR Regular Register in a roundfree synchronous system respectively for (IT B, CAM ) and (IT B, CU M ) instances of the proposed MBF model. We show the main differences in the maintenance() operation between the two solutions and we present the pseudocode to solve the problem in the (IT B, CU M ) model. The detailed description of the protocols and their correctness are presented in [9] .
Following the same approach we used in [8] for the (ΔS, CAM ) model, our solution is based on the following two key points: (1) we implement a maintenance() operation, in this case executed on demand; (2) we implement read() and write() operations following the classical quorum-based approach. The size of the quorum needed to carry on the operations, and consequently the total number of servers required by the computation, is dependent on the time to terminate the maintenance() operation, δ and Δ (see Table  IV ). The difference with respect (ΔS, CAM ) model is that the time at which mobile agents move is unknown. Notice that each mobile ma i agent has it own Δ i . Since we do not have any other information we consider Δ = min{Δ 1 , . . . , Δ f }. The maintenance() operation for (IT B, CAM ) model. This operation is executed by servers on demand (request-reply) when the oracle notifies them that are in a cured state. Notice that in the ( * , CAM) models servers know when a mobile agent leaves them, thus depending on such knowledge they execute different actions. In particular, if a server s i is not in a cured state then it does nothing, it just replies to ECHO REQ() messages. Otherwise, if a server s i is in a cured state it first cleans its local variables and broadcast to other servers a request. Then, after 2δ time units it removes values that may come from servers that were Byzantine before the 
maintenance() and updates its state by checking the number of occurrences of each value received from the other servers. Contrarily to the (ΔS, CAM ) case, a cured server notifies to all servers that it was Byzantine in the previous δ time period. This is done invoking the awareAll function that broadcasts a default value ⊥ after δ time a server discovered to be in a cured state. This is done to prevent a cured server to collect "slow" replies coming from servers that were affected before the execution of the maintenance() operation. In this model, the curing time γ ≤ 2δ.
The maintenance() operation for (IT B, CU M ) model. In this case servers are not aware of their failure state, thus they have to run such operation even if they are correct or cured. In addition, in the (IT B, CU M ) model, the moment at which mobile agents move is not known, thus as for the (IT B, CAM ) case, a request-reply pattern is used to implement the maintenance() operation. Such operation is executed by servers every 2δ times. In this case, to prevent a cured server to collect "slow" replies coming from servers that were affected before the execution of the maintenance() operation, a server choses a random number to associate to such particular maintenance() operation instance 2 , broadcast the ECHO REQ() message and waits 2δ before restart ing the operation. When there is a value whose occurrence overcomes the #echo CUM threshold, such value is stored at the server side. Notice that, contrarily to all the previous models, servers are not aware of their failure state and do not synchronize the maintenance() operation with each other. The first consequence is that a mobile agent may leave a cured server running such operation with garbage in server variables, making the operation unfruitful. Such server has to wait 2δ to run again the maintenance() operation with clean variables, so that next time it will be effective, which implies γ ≤ 4δ.
The write operation. To write a new value v, the writer increments its sequence number csn and propagates v and csn to all servers via a WRITE messages. Then, it waits for δ time units (the maximum message transfer delay) before returning. When a server s i delivers a WRITE, it updates its local variables and sends a REPLY message to all clients that are currently reading to allow them to complete their read operation.
The read operation. When a client wants to read, it broadcasts a READ request to all servers and then waits 2δ time (i.e., one round trip delay) to collect replies. When it is unblocked from the wait statement, it selects a value v occurring enough number of times (see #reply C * M from Table IV) from the replies set, sends an acknowledgement message to servers to inform that its operation is now terminated and returns v as result of the operation. When a server s i delivers a READ(j) message from client c j , it first puts its identifier in the pending read set to remember that c j is reading and needs to receive possible concurrent updates and it sends a reply back to c j . P reg Detailed Description The protocol P reg for the (IT B, CU M ) model is described in Figures 1 -3 , which present the maintenance(), write(), and read() operations, respectively. Table V reports the parameters for the protocol. In particular n CUM is the bound on the number of servers, #reply CUM is minimum number of occurrences from different servers of a value to be accepted as a reply during a read() operation and #echo CUM is the minimum number of occurrences from different servers of a value to be accepted during the maintenance() operation.
Local variables at client c i . Each client c i maintains a set reply i that is used during the read() operation to collect the three tuples j, v, sn sent back from servers. In particular v is the value, sn is the associated sequence number and j is the identifier of server s j that sent the reply back. Additionally, c i also maintains a local sequence number csn that is incremented each time it invokes a write() operation and is used to timestamp such operations monotonically.
Local variables at server s i . Each server s i maintains the following local variables (we assume these variables are initialized to zero, false or empty sets according their type):
is a value and sn the corresponding sequence number. Such tuples are ordered incrementally according to their sn values. • V saf ej : this set has the same characteristic as V j . The insert(V saf ei , v k , sn k ) function places the new value in V saf ei according to the incremental order and if dimensions exceed 3 then it discards from V saf ei the value associated to the lowest sn. • W i : is the set where servers store values coming directly from the writer, associating to it a timer, v, sn, timer . Values from this set are deleted when the timer expires or has a value non compliant with the protocol. • pending read i : set variable used to collect identifiers of the clients that are currently reading. • echo vals i and echo read i : two sets used to collect information propagated through ECHO messages. The first one stores tuple j, v, sn propagated by servers just after the mobile Byzantine agents moved, while the second stores the set of concurrently reading clients in order to notify cured servers and expedite termination of read(). • curing i : set used to collect servers running the maintenance() operation. Notice, to keep the code simple we do not explicitly manage how to empty such set since has not impact on safety properties. In order to simplify the code of the algorithm, let us define the following functions:
• select three pairs max sn(echo vals i ): this function takes as input the set echo vals i and returns, if they exist, three tuples v, sn , such that there exist at least #echo CUM occurrences in echo vals i of such tuple. If more than three of such tuples exist, the function returns the tuples with the highest sequence numbers. • select value(reply i ): this function takes as input the reply i set of replies collected by client c i and returns the pair v, sn occurring occurring at least #reply CUM times. If there are more pairs with the same occurrence, it returns the one with the highest sequence number. • conCut(V i , V saf ei , W i ): this function takes as input three 3 dimension ordered sets and returns another 3 dimension ordered set. The returned set is composed by the concatenation of V saf ei • V i • W i , without duplicates, truncated after the first 3 newest values (with respect to the timestamp). e.g.,
The maintenance() operation. Such operation is executed by servers every 2δ times. Each time s i resets its variables, except for W i (that is continuously checked by the function timerCheck()) and the content of V saf ei , which overrides the content of V i , before to be reset. Then s i choses a random number to associate to such particular maintenance() operation instance 3 , broadcast the ECHO REQ() message and waits 2δ before to restart the operation. In the meantime ECHO() messages are delivered and stored in the echo vals i set. When there is value v whose occurrence overcomes the #echo CUM threshold, such value is stored in V saf ei and a REPLY() message with v is sent to current reader clients (if any). Notice that, contrarily to all the previous models, servers are not aware about their failure state and do not synchronize the maintenance() operation with each other. The first consequence is a that a mobile agent may leave a cured server running such operation with garbage in server variables, making the operation unfruitful. Such server has to wait 2δ to run again the maintenance() operation with clean variables, so that next time it will be effective, which implies γ ≤ 4δ. The write() operation. When the writer wants to write a value v, it increments its sequence number csn and propagates v and csn to all servers. Then it waits for δ time units (the maximum message transfer delay) before returning.
When a server s i delivers a WRITE message, it updates W i , associating to such value a timer 4δ. 4δ it is a consequence of the double maintenance() operation that a cured server has to run in order to be sure to be correct. Thus if a server is correct it keeps v in W i during 4δ, which is enough for our purposes. On the other side a cured servers keeps a value (not necessarily coming from a write() operation) no more than the time it is in a cured state, 4δ, which is safe. After storing v in W i , such value is inserted in REPLY() message to all clients that are currently reading (clients in pending read i ) to notify them about the concurrent write() operation and to any server executing the maintenance() operation (servers in curing i ). The read() operation. When a client wants to read, it broadcasts a READ() request to all servers and waits 2δ time (i.e., one round trip delay) to collect replies. When it is unblocked from the wait statement, it selects a value v invoking the select value function on reply i set, sends an acknowledgement message to servers to inform that its operation is now terminated and returns v as result of the operation.
When a server s i delivers a READ(j) message from client c j it first puts its identifier in the set pending read i to remember that c j is reading and needs to receive possible concurrent updates, then s i sends a reply back to c j . Note that, in the REPLY() message is carried the result of conCut(V i , V saf ei , W i ). In this case, if the server is correct then V i contains valid values, and V saf ei contains valid values by construction, since it comes from values sent during the current maintenance(). If the server is cured, then V i and W i may contain any value. Finally, s i forwards a READ FW message to inform other servers about c j read request. This is useful in case some server missed the READ(j) message as it was affected by mobile Byzantine agent when such message has been delivered.
When a READ ACK(j) message is delivered, c j identifier is removed from both pending read i set as it does not need anymore to receive updates for the current read() operation. Wi ← Wi \ v, csn , timer j ; (04) endif (05) endFor ------------------------------------operation maintenance() executed while (TRUE) : (06) echo valsi ← ∅; Vi ← V saf e i ; V saf e ← ∅; (07) rand ← new rand(); (08) broadcast ECHO REQ(i, rand); (09) wait(2δ); ---------------------------------when select three pairs max sn(echo valsi) = ⊥ (10) insert(V saf e i , select three pairs max sn(echo valsi)); (11) for each (j ∈ (pending readi ∪ echo readi)) do (12) send REPLY (i, V saf e ) to cj ; (13) endFor ------------------------------------when ECHO (j, S, pr, r) is received: (14) if (rand = r)then: (15) echo valsi ← echo valsi ∪ v, sn j ; (16) echo readi ← echo readi ∪ pr; Correctness. All the proofs concerning the correctness of the presented algorithms can be found in [9] . The main idea is that in both cases, (IT B, CAM ) and (IT B, CU M ), the Termination properties is always guaranteed since each operation returns after a timeout. The Validity property is proved with the following steps:
• 1. maintenance() operation works (i.e., at the end of the operation n − f servers store valid values). In particular, for a given value v stored by #echo C * M correct servers at the beginning of the maintenance() operation, there are n − f servers that may store v at the end of the operation; • 2. given a write() operation that writes v at time t and terminates at time t + δ, there is a time t > t + δ after which #reply C * M correct servers store v. • 3. at the next maintenance() operation after t there are #reply C * M − f = #echo C * M correct servers that store v, for step (1) this value is maintained. • 4. the validity follows considering that the read() operation is long enough to include the t of the last written value before the read() and V is big enough to do not be full filled with new values before t .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We proposed lower bounds and matching upper bounds for the emulation of a regular register in the round free synchronous communication model under unsynchronized moves of Byzantine agents. The computed lower bounds are significantly higher than those computed for synchronized Byzantine agents model. Investigating other classical problems in the same fault model is a challenging path for future research.
